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Although data management and its careful planning are no new topics, there is only 
little literature on risk mitigation in data management plans (DMPs). We consider it a 
problem that  DMPs do  not  include  a  structured  approach for  the  identifcation  or 
mitigation  of  risks,  because  it  would  instil  confdence and trust  in  the  data  and its 
stewards, and foster the successful conduction of  data-generating projects, which often 
are  funded  research  projects.  In  this  paper,  we  present  a  lightweight  approach  for 
identifying general  risks  in DMPs.  We introduce an initial  version of  a  generic  risk 
catalogue for funded research and similar projects. By analysing a selection of  13 DMPs 
for projects from multiple disciplines published by the Research Ideas and Outcomes 
(RIO)  journal,  we  demonstrate  that  our  approach  is  applicable  to  DMPs  and 
transferable to multiple institutional constellations. As a result, the effort for integrating 
risk management in data management planning can be reduced.
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Introduction
“A data management plan (DMP) is a document that describes how you will treat your 
data during a project and what happens with the data after the project ends” (Michener, 
2015, p. 1). DMPs “serve to mitigate risks and help instil confdence and trust in the data 
and its stewards” (Donnelly, 2012, p. 83). “Planning for the effective creation, 
management and sharing of  your data enables you to get the most out of  your research” 
(Jones, 2011, p. 2). Therefore, the creation of  a DMP should not only happen for 
obtaining a grant but also for successfully conducting the proposed project.
According to ISO 31000 (International Organization for Standardization, 2009, p. 
1) a risk is “an effect of  uncertainty on objectives”. Data management plans should help 
to decrease effects of  uncertainty on project objectives. We consider it a problem that 
neither DMPs nor funders’ DMP evaluation schemes include a structured approach for 
the identifcation or mitigation of  risks, since this would foster the successful conduction 
of  data-generating projects, which often are funded research projects. We believe our 
approach will help funders evaluate risks of  proposed projects and hence the risks of  
their investment options.
Data management maturity models like the Data Management Maturity (DMM)SM 
Model (Capability Maturity Model Integration) (CMMI Institute, 2019) or the 
Enterprise Information Management (EIM) maturity model (Newman and Loga, 2008) 
are primarily designed for enterprises and may not be feasible for higher education 
institutions (HEIs). A rigid model for HEIs to coordinate support of  data management 
and sharing across a diverse range of  actors and processes to deliver the necessary 
technological and human infrastructures “cannot be prescribed since individual 
organisations and cultures occupy a spectrum of  differences” (Jones, Pryor and Whyte, 
2013, p. 4). Also, there is a potential confict between organisational demands and 
scientifc freedom. The Charter of  Fundamental Rights of  the EU contains scientifc 
freedom as a constitutional right and researchers may view the imposition of  specifc 
data management processes as a restriction of  their scientifc freedom. On an even more 
international level, the UNESCO recommends that “Each Member State should 
institute procedures adapted to its needs for ensuring that, in the performance of  
research and development, scientifc researchers respect public accountability while at 
the same time enjoying the degree of  autonomy appropriate to their task and to the 
advancement of  science and technology” (UNESCO, 2018, p. 119).
We consider it important, that researchers commit themselves to data management 
practices like e.g., ISO 31000. However, ISO 31000 (International Organization for 
Standardization, 2009, p. 14) defnes the risk management process as a feedback loop to 
be conducted in organisations. Projects tend to have a much more limited scope with 
regard to funding and duration than organisations. Therefore, we regard the ISO 31000 
risk management process as too time-consuming and of  limited suitability for funded 
research and similar projects.
In this paper, we propose a lightweight approach for the identifcation of  general 
risks in DMPs. We introduce an initial version of  a generic risk catalogue for funded 
research and similar projects. By analysing a selection of  13 DMPs for projects from 
multiple disciplines1 published by the Research Ideas and Outcomes (RIO) journal, we 
1 Anderson and Fey, 2016; Canhos, 2017; Fisher and Nading, 2016; Gatto, 2017; McWhorter, Thomas 
and Wright, 2016; Neylon, 2017; Stolze and Nichols, 2016; Pannell, 2016; Traynor, 2017; Wael, 2017; 
White, 2016; Woolfrey, 2017; Xu, Ishida and Wang, 2016
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demonstrate that our approach is applicable and transferable to multiple institutional 
constellations. As a result, the effort for integrating risk management in data 
management planning can be reduced.
Related Work
Jones, Pryor and Whyte (Jones et al., 2013, p. 2) developed a guide for HEIs “to help 
institutions understand the key aims and issues associated with planning and 
implementing research data management (RDM) services”. In this guide, the authors 
mention data management risks for HEIs. While the upfront costs for cheap storage of  
active data “may be only a fraction of  those quoted by central services, the risks of  data 
loss and security breaches are signifcantly higher, potentially leading to far greater costs 
in the long term” (Jones et al., 2013, p. 13). There are “potential legal risks from using 
third-party services” (Jones et al., 2013, p. 14). Data selection counters the risks of  
“reputational damage from exposing dirty, confdential or undocumented data that has 
been retained long after the researchers who created it have left” (Jones et al., 2013, p. 
15).
The OSCRP (Open Science Cyber Risk Profle) working group developed the 
OSCRP, which “is designed to help Principal Investigators (PI) and their supporting 
Information Technology (IT) professionals assess cybersecurity risks related to Open 
Science projects” (Peisert et al., 2017, p. 2). The OSCRP working group proposes that 
principal investigators examine risks, consequences and avenues of  attack for each 
mission critical science asset on an inventory list, whereas assets include devices, systems, 
data, personnel, workfows, and other kinds of  resources (Peisert et al., 2017). We regard 
this as a very detailed alternative to our approach, but FAIR guiding principles 
(Wilkinson et al., 2016, p. 8) and long-term preservation need to be added.
In 2014, Ferreira et al. (Ferreira et al., 2014, p. 41) “propose an analysis process for 
eScience projects using a Data Management Plan and ISO 31000 in order to create a 
Risk Management Plan that can complement the Data Management Plan”. The 
authors describe an analytical process for creating a risk management plan and “present 
the previous process’ validation, based on the MetaGen-FRAME project” (Ferreira et 
al., 2014, p. 42). Within this validation Ferreira et al. (Ferreira et al., 2014, p. 50) identify 
project task specifc risks like “R6: Loss of  metadata, denying the representation of  the 
output information to the user via Taverna”. This risk is tailored to the use of  Taverna 
and hence may not be relevant for the majority of  funded research and similar projects. 
There may be projects, for which analysing specifc risks for all resources may be crucial. 
However, a detailed risk analysis may require a considerable amount of  work.
Methods
We propose a lightweight approach that can serve as a starting point to include risk 
management in research data management planning. It doesn’t preclude detailed 
approaches like OSCRP (Peisert et al., 2017) or ISO 31000 (International Organization 
for Standardization, 2009).
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Table 1. General risk catalogue
Risk 
category
Risk Possible risk source
LEGAL Penalty for conducting unreported notifable 
practices [RLEGU] 
Physical sample collection
Penalty for unpermitted usage of  external 
data [RLEGE] 
Processing external data
Penalty for unpermitted usage of  personal 
data [RLEGP] 
Processing personal data 
Penalty for conducting inadequate data 
protection practices [RLEGD] 
Using an external service 
provider for processing 
personal data 
PRIVACY Loss of  confdentiality through sending data 
to an unintended recipient [RPRIR] 
Correspondence
Loss of  confdentiality through interception 
or eavesdropping of  information [RPRII] 
Online data transmission
Loss of  confdentiality through loss or theft of 
portable storage media or devices [RPRIS] 
Portable storage media or 
devices
Loss of  confdentiality through careless data 
handling by an external party [RPRIE] 
Sharing data with an external 




Unavailability through data corruption 
[RTECC] 
Data processing
Unavailability through data loss [RTECL] Data storage
SCIENCE Poor knowledge discovery or reusability for 
stakeholders cannot fnd the data [RSCIF] 
Searchable information not 
planned 
Poor knowledge discovery or reusability for 
stakeholders cannot access the data [RSCIA] 
Sharing location not planned
Poor knowledge discovery or reusability for 
stakeholders cannot integrate the data 
[RSCII] 
File format not planned
Poor knowledge discovery or reusability for 
stakeholders cannot reuse the data [RSCIR] 




Unsustainability in the long-term through 
unavailability or discontinuity of  fnancial 
support [RPREU]
Preservation location not 
planned
Instead, we propose an approach which tries to reduce and maybe avoid the burden 
of  a full risk management process like e.g. ISO 31000. Our approach is based on a pre-
tailored and extensible general risk catalogue (Table 1) to lessen the effort required for 
risk management. We derived part of  this risk catalogue from 29 interviews with 
researchers from multiple disciplines2, which we conducted as part of  project SynFo – 
Synergy Creation on the operational Level of  Research Data Management. One goal of  project 
2 Geo sciences (12), biology (5), humanities (5), social and behavioural sciences (4), computer science, 
systems engineering and electrical engineering (2) and medicine (1)
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SynFo was the development of  a transferable approach to improve research data 
management in multiple organisational constellations. In generalized content from the 
interviews, we identifed risks entailed by interfaces of  information, e.g. between 
researchers and data subjects or between researchers and external service providers. For 
the development of  our approach, we also consulted the catalogues for threats and 
measures from the supplement of  the “IT-Grundschutz” catalogues (Federal Offce for 
Information Security (BSI), 2016) by the German Federal Offce for Information 
Security (BSI), the FAIR guiding principles (Wilkinson et al., 2016) as well as the report 
and action plan from the European Commission expert group on FAIR data (Collins et 
al., 2018).
Our risk identifcation includes risks, their possible risk sources, mitigation 
approaches, and consequences. By analysing occurrences and mitigations of  risks from 
our catalogue within a selection of  13 DMPs from multiple disciplines3, published by the 
RIO journal, we demonstrate that our lightweight approach is applicable to DMPs and 
transferable to multiple institutional constellations. We evaluate the occurrences of  the 
15 risks in our catalogue by identifying possible risk sources in each of  the selected 
DMPs and analyse the risk mitigations in accordance to what the authors wrote.
Risks
Legal Risks
A breach of  a regulation like the GDPR or the Nagoya Protocol can result in high fnes. 
At worst, compliance breaches can lead to reputational damages, legal disputes and 
enormous cost.
Penalty for conducting unreported notifable practices
Research may include reportable research practices like the collection of  physical 
samples regulated by the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and 
Equitable Sharing of  Benefts Arising from their Utilization, which was transposed into EU law 
by Regulation (EU) No 511/2014. Under this regulation, there is a reporting obligation 
if  the research on genetic resources is fnancially supported (Regulation (EU) No 
511/2014, Art. 7, Sec. 1) and if  the fnal stage of  development of  a product that is 
based on the utilisation of  genetic resources (Regulation (EU) No 511/2014, Art. 7, Sec. 
2). Article 11 says that “Member States shall lay down the rules on penalties applicable 
to infringements of  Articles 4 and 7 and shall take all the measures necessary to ensure 
that they are applied” (Regulation (EU) No 511/2014). The Nagoya Protocol “and EU 
documents themselves give no guidance on penalties, each country has the liberty to 
determine these” (van Vegchel, 2018). Consequences may be fnes of  up to EUR 
810,000 or even imprisonment (van Vegchel, 2018). To avoid penalties, the parties 
should comply strictly with the rules. The Convention on Biological Diversity publishes 
a detailed list of  parties to the Nagoya Protocol4.
3 Biology (4), geo sciences (4), social and behavioural sciences (3), computer science, systems engineering 
and electrical engineering (1) and humanities (1)
4 Parties to the Nagoya Protocol: https://www.cbd.int/abs/nagoya-protocol/signatories/
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Penalty for unpermitted usage of external data
In many countries, data by themselves do not have inherent legal protection. Licence 
contracts can reach various agreements concerning terms of  use. Free licences make 
(data) objects available for utilisation to everyone, but usage can be restricted or 
conditioned. Creative Commons (CC) licences and the GNU General Public License 
(GPL), which is specialised for free software, are widely used. Nonetheless, using CC 
licences can lead to conficting rights of  third parties. Publicity, personality, and privacy 
rights “not held by the licensor are not affected and may still affect your desired use of  a 
licensed work” (Creative Commons, 2019). “If  there are any third parties who may have 
publicity, privacy, or personality rights that apply, those rights are not affected by your 
application of  a CC licence, and a reuser must seek permission for relevant uses” 
(Creative Commons, 2019). This e.g. holds for pictures of  persons. Also, the GNU GPL 
licence imposes transitive obligations, e.g. “derivative programmes must also be subject 
to the same initial GPL conditions of  ability to copy, modify, or redistribute” (Lipinski, 
2012, p. 312). To mitigate the risk of  unpermitted usage of  external data, it is 
recommended to abide by the licence terms. In general, an overview about the data and 
the related licences can be developed in the DMP or within the framework of  a data 
policy.
Penalty for unpermitted usage of personal data
In the EU, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) governs the processing 
of  personal data. Articles 6 and 7 of  the GDPR regulate the lawfulness of  processing 
and the conditions of  consent. On an international level, the European Commission can 
conduct an assessment to “ensure that the level of  data protection in a third country or 
international organization is essentially equivalent to the one established by the EU 
legislation” (Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 2018, p. 5). Canada (commercial 
organisations), Israel, Switzerland, Japan and the USA (limited to the Privacy Shield 
Framework) offer an adequate level of  data protection (European Commission, 2019). 
To avoid penalties, it is recommendable to receive written consents from data subjects 
including information about purpose and procedures of  data processing.
Penalty for conducting inadequate data protection practices
Article 5 of  the GDPR enumerates principles related to processing of  personal data: 
the principle of  lawfulness, fairness and transparency, purpose limitation, data 
minimisation, accuracy, storage limitation, integrity and confdentiality as well as 
accountability. According to Article 45 of  the GDPR, “A transfer of  personal data to a 
third country or an international organisation may take place where the Commission 
has decided that the third country, a territory or one or more specifed sectors within 
that third country, or the international organisation in question ensures an adequate 
level of  protection. Such a transfer shall not require any specifc authorisation” (Council 
of  the European Union and European Parliament, 2016, p. 61). Countries without 
adequacy, which are not classifed as safe third countries, can guarantee protection in 
other ways, for example by appropriate safeguards (Art. 6, GDPR) or binding corporate 
rules (Art. 7, GDPR). To avoid penalties, it is recommendable to abide by the applicable 
laws. In case of  doubt, researchers can contact the (data protection) authorities.
Privacy Risks
A loss of  confdentiality can have adverse effects on an organisation like fnancial effects 
(Federal Offce for Information Security (BSI), 2016, p. 396). These effects may also 
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apply to a researcher who additionally may want to keep research data confdential 
before scientifc output is published, so that research data will not be subject to theft of  
work.
Loss of confdentiality through sending data to an unintended 
recipient
Correspondence has the intrinsic potential that a researcher transmits data to an 
unintended recipient. This may happen accidentally or as the result of  a fraudulent 
attack like social engineering and leads to loss of  confdentiality. “Social engineering is a 
method used to gain unauthorised access to information or IT systems by social action” 
(Federal Offce for Information Security (BSI), 2016, p. 419). Researchers should take 
extra care when sending confdential information and be aware of  fraudulent attacks.
Loss of confdentiality through interception or eavesdropping of 
information
In the supplement of  the IT-Grundschutz catalogues, the BSI specifes the threats of 
interception or eavesdropping of  information, which entail the risk of  loss of  
confdentiality (Federal Offce for Information Security (BSI), 2016, p. 396). “Since data 
is sent using unforeseeable routes and nodes on the internet, the sent data should only be 
transmitted in an encrypted form, as far as possible” (Federal Offce for Information 
Security (BSI), 2016, p. 3105).
Loss of confdentiality through loss or theft of portable storage 
media or devices
“Portable terminal devices and mobile data media in particular can be lost easily” 
(Federal Offce for Information Security (BSI), 2016, p. 394) or even be stolen. 
“Whenever possible, mobile data media such as USB sticks and laptops should always be 
encrypted completely even if  they are only occasionally used for confdential 
information” (Federal Offce for Information Security (BSI), 2016, p. 3877).
Loss of confdentiality through careless data handling by an 
external party
We regard the event that researchers share data with an external party without the 
purpose of  publication as entailing the risk of  loss of  confdentiality. The external party 
may handle confdential data carelessly. “It can frequently be observed that there are a 
number of  organisational or technical security procedures available in organisations, but 
they are then undermined through careless handling of  the specifcations and the 
technology” (Federal Offce for Information Security (BSI), 2016, p. 767). We 
recommend that researchers who share their research data to always grant specifc usage 
rights in written form to the external party or to check if  appropriate security measures 
are applied by the external party.
Technical Risks
Data can lose their integrity or be lost (Federal Offce for Information Security (BSI), 
2016, pp. 422–423) leading to the major risk of  unavailability of  data. Unavailability of  
the correct data through silent corruption can lead to usage of  incorrect data and hence 
to the production of  incorrect results. If  data are unavailable, either the project may fail 
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or researchers need to repeat their data collection and the project will be behind 
schedule.
Unavailability through data corruption
“The integrity of  information may be impaired due to different causes, e.g. 
manipulations, errors caused by people, incorrect use of  applications, malfunctions of  
software or transmission errors” (Federal Offce for Information Security (BSI), 2016, p. 
423). “If  only accidental changes need to be detected, then checksum procedures (e.g. 
cyclic redundancy checks) or error-correcting codes can be used” (Federal Offce for 
Information Security (BSI), 2016, p. 2991). Nonetheless, there may be other scenarios 
where these verifcation techniques are insuffcient.
Unavailability through data loss
Data may “be lost when devices or data media are damaged, lost or stolen” (Federal 
Offce for Information Security (BSI), 2016, p. 422), hence become unavailable. 
Approaches to mitigate irretrievable losses of  data are for example regular backups 
(Federal Offce for Information Security (BSI), 2016, p. 4432) or keeping copies in 
multiple storage locations (Reich and Rosenthal, 2000).
Science Risks
Consequences of  poor discoverability and reusability of  data are that researchers may 
unnecessarily repeat work and that scientifc outputs derived from it may fail to be 
comprehensible, reproducible, or traceable. Problems with reproducibility and 
replication “can cause permanent damage to the credibility of  science” (Peng, 2015, p. 
32). For this reason, we named this category “Science risks”.
Poor knowledge discovery or reusability for stakeholders cannot 
fnd  access  integrate or reuse the data
Making data fndable, accessible, interoperable and reusable to human and 
computational stakeholders is a best practice approach described in the The FAIR Guiding  
Principles for scientifc data management and stewardship (Wilkinson et al., 2016). Therefore, we 
include the risks that stakeholders cannot fnd, access, process or reuse data in our risk 
catalogue. Authors of  DMPs can mitigate these risks as described by Wilkinson et al. 
(Wilkinson et al., 2016). We abbreviated the risk names under this risk category using the 
term ‘poor knowledge discovery or reusability’ but refer to all FAIR principles by 
Wilkinson et al. (Wilkinson et al., 2016).
Preservation Risk
If  data are not suitably preserved, scientifc outputs derived from them may fail to be 
comprehensible, reproducible, or traceable in the long run. Data should be stored in a 
trusted and sustainable digital repository (Collins et al., 2018, p. 22).
Unsustainability in the long-term through unavailability or 
discontinuity of fnancial support
A digital preservation location has the intrinsic technical risk that data become 
unavailable through data loss or corruption. However, preservation locations also entail 
the risk of  becoming unavailable when their funding ends. For example, Canhos states 
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that discontinuity of  fnancial support is a threat to Brazil’s Virtual Herbarium and its 
data sources (Canhos, 2017, p. 5). Authors of  DMPs should consider these risks when 
selecting a preservation location. They can mitigate the risk that data are not preserved 
long-term by reviewing the external preservation location’s longevity, certifcates, and 
funding. We also suggest that attention is paid to possible migration and exit strategies 
like exporting and handing over data to a national data archive. This may particularly 
be important when the preservation location is not external.
Table 2. Risk occurrences (+) and risk occurrences with at least one mitigation (-) in the sample 
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Evaluation
When applying the risk catalogue (Table 1) to the sample of  13 DMPs, we distinguish 
between risk occurrences themselves and risk occurrences with at least one mitigation as 
show in Table 2.
Table 3. Summary of  risk evaluation results
Risk from catalogue % of  risk 
occurrences 
mitigated 
Most often used 
mitigation strategy 
(in No. of  DMPs) 
Unavailability through data loss [RTECL] 100.00 Backup (8)
Poor knowledge discovery or reusability for 
stakeholders cannot access the data [RSCIA] 
100.00 Specifc repository (7)
Poor knowledge discovery or reusability for 
stakeholders cannot reuse the data [RSCIR] 
92.31 Specifc licence (9)
Unsustainability in the long-term through 
unavailability or discontinuity of  fnancial 
support [RPREU] 
76.92 Specifc fle formats (4); 
Specifc data archive (4) 
Poor knowledge discovery or reusability for 
stakeholders cannot integrate the data 
[RSCII] 
69.23 Specifc fle formats (8)
Poor knowledge discovery or reusability for 
stakeholders cannot fnd the data [RSCIF] 
61.54 Metadata (2)
Loss of  confdentiality through careless data 
handling by an external party [RPRIE] 
40.00 Agreement for IP rights 
(1); Secure external 
infrastructure (1)
Penalty for unpermitted usage of  external 
data [RLEGE] 
37.50 Respect usage permissions 
of  external data (2)
Penalty for unpermitted usage of  personal 
data [RLEGP] 
25.00 Signed consent forms (1)
Unavailability through data corruption 
[RTECC] 
15.38 Compare data from 
before and after 
transmission (1); Data 
quality control (1)
Loss of  confdentiality through interception 
or eavesdropping of  information [RPRII] 
.00
Penalty for conducting inadequate data 
protection practices [RLEGD] 
.00
Loss of  confdentiality through sending data 
to an unintended recipient [RPRIR] 
.00
Loss of  confdentiality through loss or theft 
of  portable storage media or devices 
[RPRIS] 
.00
Penalty for conducting unreported notifable 
practices [RLEGU] 
.00
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Because risk sources and mitigations were not always explicitly mentioned in the 13 
sample DMPs, we needed to make interpretations. Appendix A shows our interpretation 
notes. According to these interpretations, we found the mitigations shown in Appendix 
B.
Evaluation Results
Each of  the 15 risks of  our catalogue occurred in at least two of  the selected 13 DMPs. 
Table 3 summarises our evaluation results.
Within the small sample of  13 DMPs, we found 34 distinct strategies to mitigate ten 
of  the 15 risks of  our proposed catalogue. Hence, we also found that for fve of  the 15 
risks from our catalogue the authors did not describe any mitigation in the 
corresponding DMP. These risks are legal and privacy risks and they do have possible 
consequences like loss of  reputation or project failure through theft of  work. The 
authors of  the selected DMPs overall attach highest importance to mitigating data 
unavailability through data loss, making data fndable, accessible, interoperable and 
reusable as well as their long-term digital preservation. We found that two risks from our 
catalogue the authors mitigated in all of  the selected DMPs. These risks are 
unavailability through data loss (RTECL) and poor knowledge discoverability or 
reusability for stakeholders cannot access the data (RSCIA).
Conclusion
Since we identifed each risk of  our catalogue in at least two of  the selected DMPs, we 
conclude, that our risk catalogue is applicable to DMPs from multiple areas of  research. 
In the selected DMPs, we overall fnd 53 of  125 (42.4%) risk occurrences not mitigated 
and hence see the necessity of  DMP quality improvement through risk identifcation 
and mitigation planning in the data management planning phase.
We consider our approach useful to identify general risks in DMPs. We propose that 
after flling out a funder’s DMP template, authors of  DMPs refer to a risk catalogue to 
identify possible risk sources and hence risks. Next, the authors should add mitigations to 
their DMP in the corresponding paragraph, if  their DMP does not already contain one. 
For example, in a DMP’s paragraph in which authors write about the usage of  external 
hard disks they should add a sentence indicating that these external hard disks will be 
encrypted to mitigate the risk of  loss of  confdentiality through loss or theft of  storage 
media, if  their DMP does not yet contain any measures mitigating this risk.
The risk catalogue may also be useful to funders, since it makes it possible for them 
to evaluate basic investment risks of  proposed projects.
Many of  the legal assertions in this article hold within the EU. Applicability to non-
EU countries may vary.
We think further research on suitable risk management approaches concerning the 
data management of  funded research and similar projects needs to be conducted.
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In Anderson and Fey’s DMP (Anderson and Fey, 2016), we interpret the choice of  
txt- and csv-formats as open fle formats for interoperability and we interpret the use of  
metadata standards as to mitigate the risk that data are not fndable.
Canhos states that discontinuity of  fnancial support is a threat to Brazil’s Virtual 
Herbarium and its data sources (Canhos, 2017, p. 5). We interpret this as the risk that 
data are not preserved long-term.
In Fisher and Nading’s DMP (Fisher and Nading, 2016), we fnd only geospatial 
metadata mentioned. Neither documentation nor licence information are mentioned in 
Fisher and Nading’s DMP (Fisher and Nading, 2016).
We assume, data are enriched or combined so that a licence of  the resulting data set 
should be derived from the source data licences in Gatto’s DMP (Gatto, 2017). We 
evaluate Gatto’s DMP (Gatto, 2017) according to the FAIR-principles for research 
software as proposed by Jiménez et al. (Jiménez et al., 2017).
Concerning McWhorter, Wright and Thomas’ DMP (McWhorter et al., 2016), we 
assume that data do not have protection requirements and no risk of  interception 
because data are made freely available for public use.
Neylon’s DMP (Neylon, 2017) does not include collecting signed forms of  consent 
from interviewees. Neylon decides not to make all data anonymous and accessible 
(Neylon, 2017, p. 5). Neylon’s DMP (Neylon, 2017) does not include using fle formats 
that are interoperable or allow re-use.
Concerning Pannell’s DMP (Pannell, 2016), we think that it would be adequate to 
inform the responsible authority about the planned research project. Pannell (Pannell, 
2016) does not address rights of  use of  external data. We interpret the used term 
"flterable" in the context of  metadata documentation (Pannell, 2016, p. 6) as "fndable".
Stolze and Nichols’ DMP (Stolze and Nichols, 2016) describes migration of  data 
from old storage media to xlsx-format and their publication.
In Traynor’s DMP (Traynor, 2017), it is not clear if  personal data are anonymised 
before they are uploaded in the infrastructure of  an external service provider. Traynor’s 
DMP (Traynor, 2017) contains no decisions for metadata capture or a specifc long-term 
preservation location.
Wael plans to hire a consultant to do technical planning and system set up (Wael, 
2017, p. 4). Wael’s DMP (Wael, 2017) does not include making data interoperable. We 
think that utilizing academic contacts to make the research community know that the 
data exist as stated by Wael (Wael, 2017, p. 5) is not the same as making data fndable.
According to White’s DMP, the project members will develop data and software “in 
the open” (White, 2016, p. 3) which we interpret as making data accessible. In his DMP, 
White does not mention long-term preservation (White, 2016). We regard the metadata 
capture and user-focused documentation stated in White’s DMP (White, 2016, p. 2) as 
making data re-usable.
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In Woolfrey’s DMP (Woolfrey, 2017, p. 4), metadata are captured for re-usability. 
Woolfrey’s DMP (Woolfrey, 2017) does not include making data fndable.
Xu, Ishida and Wang (Xu, Ishida and Wang, 2016) do not explicitly state in which 
states or countries they plan to collect physical samples. We make the interpretation, that 
physical samples are registered with a persistent identifer as described by Xu, Ishida 
and Wang (Xu, Ishida and Wang, 2016, p. 2) to make their metadata fndable. Xu, 
Ishida and Wang (Xu, Ishida and Wang, 2016) write that for re-use and distribution, 
IEDA (Interdisciplinary Earth Data Alliance) would have a persistent identifer assigned 
to the data sets (Xu, Ishida and Wang, 2016, p. 3).
Appendix B
Table 4. Risk mitigations
DMP Risk mitigations
Anderson and Fey, 
2016
Backup (RTECL); Provide rights of  use (RSCIR); Specifc data archive 
(RPREU, RSCIA); Metadata (RSCIF); Metadata standard (RSCIF); 
Publicly accessible server (RSCIA); Specifc fle formats (RSCII)
Canhos, 2017 Aligned licensing of  all data (RLEGE); Backup (RTECL); Maintain 
blog and social media account (RSCIF); Publicly accessible server 
(RSCIA); Specifc fle formats (RSCIR); Specifc licence (RSCIR); 
Metadata or citation of  external data (RSCIR); Standard data model 
(RSCIR) 
Fisher and Nading, 
2016
Backup (RTECL); Specifc data archive (RPREU, RSCIA); Listing in 
national discipline specifc Wiki (RSCIF); Listing on funders website 
(RSCIF); Specifc fle formats (RSCII)
Gatto, 2017 Multiple storage locations (RTECL); Specifc licence (RSCIR); 
Collaborative software development (RPREU, RSCIF); Specifc 





Data are freely available for public use (RSCIR); Data quality control 
(RTECC); Backup (RTECL); Multiple preservation locations (RTECL, 
RPREU); Specifc data archive (RPREU); Publicly accessible server 
(RSCIA); Specifc fle formats (RSCII); Metadata (RSCIR)
Neylon, 2017 Multiple storage locations (RTECL); Specifc licence (RSCIR); Multiple 
preservation locations (RPREU); Specifc fle formats (RPREU, RSCII); 
Persistent identifer (RSCIF); Specifc repository (RSCIA); 
Documentation (RSCIR)
Pannell, 2016 Secure external service infrastructure (RPRIE); Replicas in external 
service infrastructure (RTECL); Specifc licence (RSCIR); Preservation 
at institution’s library (RPREU); Specifc fle formats (RPREU, RSCII); 
Specifc repository (RSCIA); Metadata (RSCIF); Persistent identifer 
(RSCIR)
Stolze and Nichols, 
2016
Compare data from before and after transmission (RTECC); Backup 
(RTECL); Multiple storage locations (RTECL); Specifc licence 
(RSCIR); Repository guarantees long-term availability (RPREU); 
Publish data descriptor in open access journal (RSCIF, RSCIR); 
Specifc repository (RSCIA); Specifc fle formats (RSCII); 
Documentation (RSCIR); Metadata (RSCIR); Persistent identifer 
(RSCIR)
Traynor, 2017 Signed consent forms (RLEGP); Multiple storage locations (RTECL); 
Backup (RTECL); Specifc licence (RSCIR); Specifc fle formats 
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DMP Risk mitigations
(RPREU); Specifc repository (RSCIA); Specifc fle formats (RSCII); 
Documentation (RSCIR)
Wael, 2017 Multiple storage locations (RTECL); Agreement for IP rights (RPRIE); 
Specifc licence (RSCIR); Publicly accessible server (RSCIA); 
Anonymization (RSCIR); Documentation (RSCIR); Specifc fle 
formats (RSCIR)
White, 2016 Respect usage permissions of  external data (RLEGE); Backup 
(RTECL); Specifc licence (RSCIR); Specifc repository (RSCIA); 
Metadata (RSCIR); Documentation (RSCIR)
Woolfrey, 2017 Respect usage permissions of  external data (RLEGE); Backup 
(RTECL); Data are freely available for public use (RSCIR); Specifc 
data archive (RPREU, RSCIA); Specifc fle formats (RSCII); 
Documentation (RSCIR); Metadata (RSCIR); Metadata standard 
(RSCIR)
Xu, Ishida and 
Wang, 2016
Multiple storage locations (RTECL); Specifc licence (RSCIR); Specifc 
fle formats (RPREU); Specifc repository (RPREU, RSCIA); Persistent 
identifer for physical samples (RSCIF); Documentation (RSCIR); 
Metadata (RSCIR); Persistent identifer (RSCIR); Standardised 
vocabulary (RSCIR)
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